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Abstract. There have been many proposals for access control models
and authorization policy languages, which are used to inform the de-
sign of access control systems. Most, if not all, of these proposals impose
restrictions on the implementation of access control systems, thereby
limiting the type of authorization requests that can be processed or the
structure of the authorization policies that can be specified. In this paper,
we develop a formal characterization of the features of an access control
model that imposes few restrictions of this nature. Our characterization
is intended to be a generic framework for access control, from which
we may derive access control models and reason about the properties of
those models. In this paper, we consider the properties of monotonicity
and completeness, the first being particularly important for attribute-
based access control systems. XACML, an XML-based language and ar-
chitecture for attribute-based access control, is neither monotonic nor
complete. Using our framework, we define attribute-based access control
models, in the style of XACML, that are, respectively, monotonic and
complete.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental security services in modern computer systems is access
control, a mechanism for constraining the interaction between (authenticated)
users and protected resources. Generally, access control is enforced by a trusted
component (historically known as the reference monitor), which typically im-
plements two functions: an authorization enforcement function (AEF) and an
authorization decision function (ADF). The AEF traps all attempts by a user to
interact with a resource (usually known as a user request) and transforms that
request into one or more authorization queries (also known as authorization
requests) which are forwarded to the ADF.
Most access control systems are policy-based. That is, an administrator spec-
ifies an authorization policy, which, in its simplest form, encodes those autho-
rization requests that are authorized. The ADF takes an authorization query
and an authorization policy as input and returns an authorization decision. For
this reason, it is common to refer to the AEF and ADF as the policy enforcement
point (PEP) and policy decision point (PDP), respectively; it is this terminology
that we will use henceforth.
An authorization policy is merely an encoding of the access control require-
ments of an application using the authorization language that is understood by
the PDP. It is necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between an ideal pol-
icy and a realizable policy: the former is an arbitrary function from requests to
decisions; the latter is a function that can be evaluated by the PDP. Given a
particular policy language, there might be some ideal policies that are not real-
izable, which may be a limitation of the policy language in practice. The access
control system used in early versions of Unix, for example, is rather limited [1,
§15.1.1]. An important consideration, therefore, when designing an access control
system is the expressivity of the policy language.
The increasing prevalence of open, distributed, computing environments
means that we may not be able to rely on a centralized authentication func-
tion to identify authorized users. This means that authorization decisions have
to be made on the basis of (authenticated) user attributes (rather than user
identities). In turn, this means that the structure of authorization queries needs
to be rather more flexible than that used in closed, centralized environments.
The draft XACML 3.0 standard, for example, uses a much “looser” query for-
mat than its predecessor XACML 2.0. However, if we have no control over the
attributes that are presented to the PDP, then a malicious user (or a user who
wishes to preserve the secrecy of some attributes) may be able to generate au-
thorization decisions that are more “favorable” by withholding attributes from
the PEP [2,3]. A second important consideration, therefore, is whether autho-
rization policies are guaranteed to be “monotonic” in the sense that providing
fewer attributes in an authorization query yields a less favorable outcome (from
the requester’s perspective).
There is an extensive literature on languages for specifying authorization
policies, most approaches proposing a new language or an extension of an ex-
isting one. The proliferation of languages led Ferraiolo and Atluri to raise the
question in [4] of whether a meta-model for access control was needed and pos-
sible to achieve, hinting at XACML [5] and RBAC [6] as potential candidates.
In response, Barker proposed a meta-model [7], which sought to identify the key
components required to specify access control policies, based on a term-rewriting
evaluation.
In this paper, we do not present “yet another language” for access control
policies, nor do we claim to have a “unifying meta-model”. We focus instead
on reasoning about the properties of a language. Indeed, we advocate the idea
that a language is just a tool for policy designers: just as some programming
languages are better suited to particular applications, it seems unlikely that
there exists a single access control model (or meta-model) that is ideal in all
possible contexts. On the contrary, we believe that providing the structure to
formally analyse a language might be valuable to a policy designer, in order to
understand the suitability of a particular language as the basis for a specific
access control system.
We conclude this section by summarizing the structure and contributions of
the paper. In Sec. 2 we propose a general framework for access control, whose
role is not to be used as an off-the-shelf language, but as a way to identify and
reason about the key aspects of a language. In Sec. 3 we define monotonicity
and completeness in the context of our framework. Then in Sec. 4 we define two
attribute-based models, respectively monotonic and complete, by building on
existing results from the literature on multi-valued and partial logic. The main
body of the paper ends with discussions of related and future work.
2 A Framework for Defining Access Control Models
In this section we describe the various components of our framework and intro-
duce our formal definition of access control models and policies. Broadly speak-
ing, we provide a generic method for designing access control models and for
furnishing access control policies, which are written in the context of a model,
with authorization semantics. We also introduce the notion of an ideal policy,
which is an abstraction of the requirements of an organization, and relate this
concept to that of an access control policy.
2.1 An Informal Overview
From an external viewpoint, an access control mechanism is a process that con-
strains the interactions between users and data objects. Those interactions are
modeled as access requests, with the mechanism incorporating two functions:
one to determine whether a request is authorized or not and one to enforce that
decision. The overall process must be total, in the sense that its behavior is
defined for every possible interaction (which may include some default behavior
that is triggered when the decision function is unable to return a decision). In
general, designing a particular access control mechanism for a particular set of
requests is the final concrete objective of any access control framework (although
we are also clearly interested in expressing general properties of the framework).
We define an access control mechanism using an access control policy, to-
gether with an interpretation function which provides the authorization seman-
tics for a policy. Intuitively, a policy is simply a syntactical object, built from
atomic policies and policy connectives. The interpretation function provides the
denotational semantics of the policy, by returning a function from requests to
decision, thus defining the expected behavior of the PDP. Clearly, a policy can
be interpreted in different ways, and an interpretation function can interpret
different policies, as long as they are built from the same atomic policies and
connectives.
An access control model defines an access control language, which consists of
a set of atomic polices and policy connectives, and an interpretation function. In
other words, an access control model specifies a set of access control policies and
a unique way to interpret each of these policies. An access control mechanism,
then, is an instance of an access control model if its policy belongs to the language
of the model and if its interpretation function is that of the model.
2.2 The Framework
In order to provide a framework within which policies can be constructed,
we introduce the notion of access control model, which is a tuple M =
(Q,A,Ops,Dec, J·K), where Q is a set of requests, A a set of atomic authorization
policies, Ops a set of policy connectives, Dec a set of (authorization) decisions,
and, for each A ∈ A, JAK is a total function from Q to Dec defining the evaluation
of policy A for all requests in Q.
Each k-ary policy connective op in Ops is identified with a function op :
Deck → Dec. We construct an authorization policy P using elements of A and
Ops. We extend the evaluation function for atomic policies to arbitrary policies:
that is, JP K : Q→ Dec provides a method of evaluating requests with respect to
a policy P . We say that J·K defines the authorization semantics of the model.
The syntax by which policies are defined and the extension of the autho-
rization semantics for atomic policies to non-atomic policies are fixed (for all
models), as specified in Definition 1 below. Nevertheless, different choices for
Dec, A and J·K give rise to very different models having very different properties.
A policy term P is defined by a (rooted) policy tree, in which leaf nodes are
atomic policies and each non-leaf node is a policy connective (we may also use
the term policy operator). More formally we have the following definition:
Definition 1 Let M = (Q,A,Ops,Dec, J·K) be a model. Then every atomic
policy in A is a policy term. If P1, . . . , Pk are policy terms, then for each k-
ary operator op ∈ Ops, op(P1, . . . , Pk) is a policy term. For each policy term
op(P1, . . . , Pk), we define
Jop(P1, . . . , Pk)K(q) = op(JP1K(q), . . . , JPkK(q)). (1)
In other words, authorization policies are represented as policy trees and
policies are evaluated from the bottom up by (a) evaluating atomic policies
(b) combining the decisions returned for atomic policies using the relevant policy
connectives.3 We write P(M) to denote the set of policies that can be expressed
within M.
Given a set of queries Q and a set of decisions Dec, an ideal access control
policy is a total function pi : Q → Dec.4 We say that an ideal policy pi is
realizable by an access control model M if, and only if, there exists a policy
term P ∈ P(M) such that for any query q, pi(q) = JP K(q); in the interests of
simplicity we will abuse notation and write pi ∈ P(M) and pi = (M, P ).
Figure 1 shows two policy trees each having the same atomic policies, A1
and A2. The figure also shows two evaluations of the tree for the same request q,
3 Strictly speaking, we should use different symbols for a policy connective and the
decision operator with which it is associated. We have chosen to abuse notation in
the interests of clarity, because little is gained by strict adherence to formality here.
4 Clearly, a policy designer could define a policy extensionally, simply by associating
each query with a decision. However, in practice, policies are constructed in a mod-
ular fashion, where each component defines a particular security concern and the
decisions from different components are combined.
where JAK1(q) = 1 and JA2K(q) = ⊥. The symbols 1, 0 and ⊥ denote allow, deny
and inapplicable decisions, respectively. The policy trees are evaluated using
a post-order traversal, in which each leaf node is assigned a value according
to the semantics defined by J·K and each interior node is assigned a value by
combining the values assigned to its child nodes. The policies in Figure 1 make
use of three operators taken from Table 1. Both △ and ∧ are similar to the
allow-overrides operator familiar from XACML (and also the two conjunction
operators from Kleene’s 3-valued logic) and only differ in the way in which ⊥
is combined with 1. The ∼ unary operator implements a deny-by-default rule,
thus JP1K(q) 6= JP2K(q).
A1
△
A2
∼
(a) P1
JA1K(q) = 1
1
JA2K(q) = ⊥
1
(b) JP1K(q)
A1
∧
A2
∼
(c) P2
JA1K(q) = 1
⊥
JA2K(q) = ⊥
0
(d) JP2K(q)
Fig. 1. Illustrative policy trees and their evaluation
In general, an access control model does not specify any policy in particular
(unless the language is so restricted that it can only specify one policy). To some
extent, an access control model (in the sense in which we use the term in this
paper) is analogous to a programming language: it describes the syntax that is
used to build access control policies (analogous to programs) and the semantics
of the run-time mechanisms that will be used to handle input data (access con-
trol requests in this context). A realizable policy is in this case analogous to a
program P written in the syntax of the model M, that is interpreted using the
authorization semantics of the model, while an ideal policy is analogous to the
set of functional requirements.
Note that an ideal policy can be realized by different access control models:
pi ∈ P(M) and pi ∈ P(M′) with M 6= M′. In other words, different access
control mechanisms may be able to enforce the same security requirements. And
pi may be realizable by different policy terms from the same access control model:
pi = (M, P ) and pi = (M, P ′) with P 6= P ′. In other words, security requirements
can be enforced by the same mechanism using different policies. However, an
ideal policy may not be realizable by any policy term for a given model; the
extent to which a model can realize the set of ideal policies provides us with a
notion of the completeness of a model (as we discuss in Section 3.2).
2.3 Framework Instantiation
A model provides the global structure from which access control policies can be
built. A simple example of a model is the protection matrix model [8], which can
be viewed as a set of triples (s, o, x), where s is a subject, o an object and x an
access mode. A query is also a triple (s, o, x), and is authorized if, and only if,
it belongs to the set representing the matrix. Hence, we define the set of queries
QAM to be the set of all triples (s, o, x), the set of decisions DecAM = {1, 0},
where 1 stands for an authorized access and 0 for a denied one, the set of atomic
policies AAM = QAM ∪ {0}, the set of operators OpsAM = {∨}, where ∨ is the
standard boolean disjunction, and the interpretation function J·KAM to be:
JpKAM(q) =


1 if p = q
0 otherwise.
For instance, the policy authorizing only the accesses (s1, o1, x1) and (s2, o2, x2)
can be defined as (s1, o1, x1) ∨ (s2, o2, x2).
Models can also consider richer sets of queries. Indeed, recent work considers
the possibility that, in order to make a decision, an access control system might
require more attributes than the traditional subject-object-action triple [2,5,9].
In order to define requests and atomic policies it is necessary to identify sets
of attributes and the values that each of those attributes may take. Role-based
access control, to take a simple example, defines the sets of roles, users and
permissions, together with user-role and permission-role assignment relations.
We now introduce the notions of attribute vocabulary and attribute-based
access control, which are intended to be as general as possible and allow for the
construction of requests and policies.
Definition 2 Let N denote a set of attribute names, and D denote a set of
attribute domains. Let dom : N → D be a function, where dom(α) denotes the
set of attribute values associated with attribute α. Then (N ,D, dom) defines an
attribute vocabulary.
When no confusion can occur, we will simply write N to denote an attribute
vocabulary. A request is modeled as a set of name-value pairs of the form (α, v),
where α ∈ N . We denote the set of requests by Q∗(N ), omitting N when it is
obvious from context. We say an attribute name-value pair (α, v) is well-formed
if α ∈ N and v ∈ dom(α). We assume that a PDP can recognize (and discard)
name-value pairs in a request that are not well-formed.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) policies are modular. Hence, a policy
component may be incomplete or two policy components may return contradic-
tory decisions. Thus, it is common to see additional decisions used to denote a
policy “gap” or “doubt” indicating different reasons why policy evaluation could
not reach a conclusive (allow or deny) decision [10,9]. We write Three = {1, 0,⊥},
where JAK(q) = ⊥ indicates that JAK(q) is neither 0 nor 1.
In Table 1 we summarize the characteristics of some useful 3-valued opera-
tors, most of which are self-explanatory. The ? operator acts as a policy filter:
Jp1 ?p2K = Jp2K if Jp1K = 1, and evaluates to ⊥ otherwise. The ∨∧ operator models
policy unanimity: p1 ∨∧ p2 evaluates to a conclusive decision only if both p1 and
p2 do. In Sec. 4.3 we describe a model with a 4-valued decision set.
d1 d2 ¬d1 ∼ d1 d1 ∧ d2 d1 △ d2 d1 ∨ d2 d1 ▽ d2 d1 ? d2 d1 ∨∧ d2 d1 ⊲ d2
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ⊥ 1
1 ⊥ 0 1 ⊥ 1 1 1 ⊥ ⊥ 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 ⊥ ⊥ 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ⊥ 0 0
0 ⊥ 1 0 0 0 ⊥ 0 ⊥ ⊥ 0
⊥ 1 ⊥ 0 ⊥ 1 1 1 ⊥ ⊥ 1
⊥ 0 ⊥ 0 0 0 ⊥ 0 ⊥ ⊥ 0
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Table 1. Operators over {1, 0,⊥}
ABAC is designed for open distributed systems, meaning that authenticated
attributes and policy components may need to be retrieved from multiple loca-
tions. Thus, some languages assume that policy evaluation may fail: it may be,
for example, that a policy server or policy information point is down. PTaCL [2]
relies on a three-valued logic, and considers sets of decisions in order to model
indeterminacy. XACML 3.0 [5] considers a six-valued decision set, three of those
decisions representing different indeterminate answers.
3 Monotonicity and Completeness
An access control model provides a policy designer with a language to construct
a policy. That language may well have an impact on the policies that can be ex-
pressed and the properties of those policies. In this section we study two specific
properties of access control models, monotonicity (a kind of safety property) and
completeness (an expressivity property), and we present two models satisfying
these properties in Section 4.
3.1 Monotonicity
Informally, a policy is monotonic whenever removing information from a request
does not lead to a “better” policy decision. Such a property is of particular rel-
evance in open systems, where users might be able to control what information
they supply to the access control mechanism. A model in which all realizable
policies are monotonic implies that they are not vulnerable to attribute hiding
attacks [2]. That is, a malicious user gains no advantage by suppressing infor-
mation when making a request.
We model information hiding using a partial ordering 6Q on Q; the intuitive
interpretation of q 6Q q
′ is that q contains less information than q′. For instance,
an attribute query q is less than another query q′ when q ⊆ q′. We also need to
specify what it means for a decision to “benefit” a user, and thus we assume the
existence of an ordering relation 6 on Dec; again, the intuitive interpretation of
d1 6 d2 is that the decision d2 is of greater benefit than d1.
5 For instance, we
can consider the ordering 63 over {1, 0,⊥}, such that x 63 y if and only if x = y
or x = ⊥.
Definition 3 Given a set of authorization queries (Q,6Q) and a set of decisions
(Dec,6), a policy φ : Q → Dec is monotonic if, and only if, for all q, q′ ∈
Q, q 6Q q′ implies φ(q) 6 φ(q′). We say that an access control model M =
(Q,A,Dec,Ops, J·K) is monotonic if for all P ∈ P(M), JP K is monotonic.
Note that our definition of a monotonic policy applies equally well to an
ideal policy pi : Q → Dec or a realizable policy term P with authorization
semantics JP K : Q→ Dec. However, the notion of monotonicity is dependent on
the request ordering. For instance, without further characterization, the request
ordering for the access matrix could be reduced to equality, making any policy
trivially monotonic. However, more complex situations can be considered by
adding extra information, such as an ordering over subjects or objects.
Tschantz and Krisnamurthi have shown that XACML 2.0 is not monotonic
(although they called the property “safety” rather than monotonicity) [11]. We
show in Section 4.1—provided certain restrictions are imposed on the structure of
requests—that it is possible to develop a monotonic, attributed-based (XACML-
like) access control model, using results from partial logic [12].
3.2 Completeness
Given a modelM = (Q,A,Dec,Ops, J·K), any realizable policy P ∈ P(M) clearly
corresponds to an ideal policy pi : Q → Dec. However, there may exist an ideal
policy pi (for Q and Dec) that does not belong to P(M) and cannot, therefore, be
enforced by the policy decision point. Trivially, for example, a model without any
atomic policies does not realize any policies. It follows that the set of ideal policies
that can be realized by a model represents an intuitive notion of expressivity. A
model that can realize every ideal policy is said to be complete. More formally:
Definition 4 An access control model M = (Q,A,Dec,Ops, J·K) is complete if,
and only if for any ideal policy pi : Q→ Dec, pi ∈ P(M).
The completeness of a model (Q,A,Dec,Ops, J·K) will depend on the autho-
rization vocabulary, the definition of atomic policies, the set Ops and J·K. The
access matrix model defined in Section 2.3, for example, is complete.
Proposition 5 The model (QAM,AAM,DecAM,OpsAM, J·KAM) is complete.
5 Note that we consider this relation to be statically defined over decisions, and to be
independent of the request.
On the other hand, it is easy to show that XACML is not complete, unless we
allow the inclusion of XACML conditions, which are arbitrary functions. Indeed,
consider two attributes α1 and α2 with two respective attribute values v1 and v2,
it is not possible to construct a policy that evaluates q1 = {(α1, v1)} to Permit
and q2 = {(α1, v1), (α2, v2)} to NA, intuitively because any target not applicable
to q2 cannot be applicable to q1.
We propose an attribute-based access control model in Section 4.2 in which
the representation of atomic policies can distinguish attribute name-value pairs,
from which we can prove a completeness result. However, it is worth observing
that, in general, if a model is both monotonic and complete, then the ordering
over requests is limited to the identity relation, as illustrated above with the
access matrix.
Proposition 6 Given any model M = ((Q,6Q),A, (Dec,6),Ops, J·K), if M is
complete and monotonic and if |Dec| > 1, then 6Q is the identity relation.
Informally, this result states that if we wish to have a (non-trivial) monotonic
model then we cannot expect to have a complete model. Instead, what we should
aim for is a model that realizes at least all monotonic ideal policies, and such a
model is said to be monotonically-complete. In Section 4, we show how to define
monotonically-complete and complete attribute-based access control models that
have similar characteristics to XACML.
4 Designing Attribute-based Access Control Models
It could be argued that the main objective of XACML is to provide a standard
addressing as many practical concerns as possible, rather than a language with
formal semantics. Nevertheless, the design choices can and should be analyzed
with respect to the properties they entail. We do not claim here that XACML
should be monotonic, complete, or monotonically-complete, but we show instead
how, building from existing logical results, one can instantiate an access control
model with these properties.
The results in this section can provide guidance to the designer of an access
control system. She can choose, for example, between a system that realizes only
and all monotonic policies, and a system in which all policies are realizable, but
some may be non-monotonic. Clearly, the choice depends on the demands of the
application and the constraints of the underlying environment. While we cannot
make this choice for the policy designer, our framework can only help her make
an informed decision.
If the attribute vocabulary were countably infinite (and the cardinality of
the decision set is greater than 1) then the number of ideal policies would be
uncountably infinite (by a standard diagonalization argument). However, the
number of realizable policies can, at best, be countably infinite, by construction.
Accordingly, it is only meaningful to consider completeness if we assume that
the attribute vocabulary is finite (but unbounded). In practice, of course, all
attribute values will be stored as variables and there will be an upper limit on
the size of such variables, so the attribute vocabulary will be finite and bounded,
albeit by a very large number.
4.1 ABACM: A monotonic monotonically-complete model
Recall from Definition 2 that, given a vocabulary N , we write Q∗(N ) to de-
note the set of requests. Note that a request may contain (well-formed) pairs
(α, v1, ), . . . , (α, vn) having the same attribute name and different values. One
obvious example arises when α is the “role” attribute name and vi is the identifier
of a role. We define the set of atomic policies A(N ) to be the set of well-formed
name-value pairs. That is A(N ) = {(α, v) : α ∈ N and v ∈ dom(α)}. Then we
define
J(α, v)K(q) =


1 if q ∋ (α, v′) and v = v′,
⊥ if q 6∋ (α, v′),
0 otherwise.
Note that the above interpretation of atomic policies is by no means the only
possibility. In the context of a three-value decision set, we might return 0 if
q ∋ (α, v′) and v 6= v′, ⊥ if q 6∋ (α, v′) and 1 otherwise. In the context of a
four-value decision set, we could return ⊤ if q ⊇ {(α, v′), (α, v)}, since such a
request both matches and does not match the attribute value v for attribute α.
We discuss these possibilities in more detail in Sec. 4.3.
The ordering on Q∗, denoted by 6Q, is simply subset inclusion. We define
the ordering 63 on Three, where x 63 y if and only if x = y or x = ⊥. It is
worth observing that if a request contains at most one value for each attribute,
then each atomic policy is monotonic. More formally, if we define the set of
queries Q? = {q ⊆ A(N ) | ∀α (α, v) ∈ q ∧ (α, v′) ∈ q ⇒ v = v′}, we can prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For all requests q, q′ ∈ Q? such that q 6Q q′ and for all atomic
policies (α, v) ∈ A(N ), we have J(α, v)K(q) 63 J(α, v)K(q
′).
We will see in the following section that we can define a complete ABAC
model that accepts requests from Q∗, but we can no longer ensure monotonicity.
We now define a monotonic and monotonically-complete attribute-based access
control (ABAC) model.
Definition 8 ABACM is defined to be (Q?,A(N ),Three, {¬,∧,∨,∨∧, ?} , J·K).
ABACM is not merely of academic interest because it incorporates a number
of features that are similar to XACML. In particular, we can
– construct targets from conjunctions and disjunctions of atomic policies;
– use the operators ∧ and ∨ to model deny-overrides and allow-overrides
policy-combining algorithms;
– construct (XACML) rules, policies and policy sets using policies of the form
p1 ? p2, since Jp1 ? p2K = Jp2K if Jp1K = 1 (corresponding to “matching” a
request to “target” p1 and then evaluating policy p2).
The correspondence between ABACM and XACML cannot be exact, given that
XACML is not monotonic. The main difference lies in the way in which ∧ and
∨ handle the ⊥ decision. The operators ∧ and ∨ are what Crampton and Huth
called intersection operators [13], whereas the policy-combining algorithms in
XACML are union operators. Informally, an intersection operator requires both
operands to have conclusive decisions, while a union operator ignores inconclu-
sive decisions. Thus, for example, 1∧⊥ = ⊥, whereas the XACML deny-overrides
algorithm would return 1 given the same arguments.
A practical consequence of the design goals of ABACM is that the ⊥ decision
will be returned more often than for analogous policies in XACML (or other
non-monotonic languages). In practice, the policy enforcement point will have
to either (a) ask the requester to supply additional attributes in the request; or
(b) deny all requests that are not explicitly allowed.
Theorem 9 ABACM is monotonic and monotonically complete.
Proof. Let us first observe that the operators ¬,∧,∨,∨∧ and ?, as defined in Ta-
ble 1, are monotonic with respect to 63. Following Proposition 7, we know that
atomic policies are monotonic, and by direct induction, we can conclude that
any policy in P(ABACM) is monotonic, and thus that ABACM is monotonic.
Now, let pi : Q? → Three be a monotonic ideal policy. We show that there
exists a policy P (pi) such that (ABACM, P (pi)) realizes pi. (Q?,6Q) is a finite
partially ordered set, so we may enumerate its elements using a topological sort.
That is we may write Q? = [q0, q1, . . . , qn], for some n determined by N and
dom(α), α ∈ N ; and for all i 6 j, qj 6 Q qi. In particular, we have q0 = ∅.
For any non-empty request q = {(α1, v1), . . . , (αm, vm)}, we define the policy
tq = (α1, v1) ∧ . . . ∧ (αm, vm). Note that JtqK(q′) = 1 for all q′ > q. Now, we
have JtqiK(q0) = ⊥ for all qi. Moreover, for j > i > 0, we have JtqiK(qi) = 1
and Jtqj K(qi) 6= 1. In other words, for every request q there is a value m such
that JtqmK(q) = 1 and JqjK(q) 6= 1 for all j > m. We now define the policy
⊕pi(tq1 , . . . , tqn), where
⊕pi(d1, . . . , dn) =


pi(qm) where m = max {i : di = 1}
pi(∅) otherwise.
defines an n-ary operator ⊕pi.
We now prove that ⊕pi is monotonic. Intuitively, we want to prove that the
order over tuples of decisions implies the order over requests, in order to use
the monotonicity of pi. Let d1, . . . , dn ∈ Three and d′1, . . . , d
′
n ∈ Three with
d′i 6 di, 1 6 i 6 n. Let q
′ and q be the requests identified by (d′1, . . . , d
′
n)
and (d1, . . . , dn), respectively. By definition, we have ⊕pi(d′1, . . . , d
′
n) = pi(q
′)
and ⊕pi(d1, . . . , dn) = pi(q). Furthermore, let m be the maximal index such that
d′m = 1, it follows that q
′ = qm. Since d
′
m 6 dm, we can deduce that dm = 1,
implying that qm 6Q q, that is, q
′ 6Q q. By hypothesis, pi is monotonic, and
thus we have pi(q′) 6 pi(q), allowing us to conclude that ⊕pi is monotonic.
Finally, we know, by a result of Blamey [12], that any monotonic opera-
tor can be built from {¬,∧,∨,∨∧}. In other words, the policy ⊕pi(tq1 , . . . , tqn)
belongs to ABACM, and therefore we can conclude that pi can be realized by
(ABACM,⊕pi(tq1 , . . . , tqn)).
Theorem 9 demonstrates that all access control policies built and evaluated
using ABACM are monotonic, and that all monotonic ideal policies can be realized
by a policy in ABACM. Hence, if policy monotonicity is an important feature for
a system designer, then ABACM provides that guarantee. However, ABACM is
not complete, since some (non-monotonic) ideal policies cannot be built from it.
We propose in the following section a complete model.
4.2 ABACC: A complete model
In some situations, one might want to define non-monotonic policies or we might
want to consider a query set in which the same attribute can have different values
within a given query. In such situations, we consider the model ABACC which,
in addition to being complete, is defined over the set of queries Q∗.
Definition 10 ABACC is defined to be (Q∗,A(N ),Three, {¬,∼,∨} , J·K).
Theorem 11 ABACC is complete.
Proof. The structure of this proof is similar to that of Theorem 9, with the
difference that the ideal policy pi need not be monotonic. We show that there
exists a policy p(pi) in ABACC that realizes pi.
Concretely, we consider the enumeration over the requests, and we build the
same operator ⊕pi. However, in this case, we do not need to prove the mono-
tonicity of ⊕pi, and we use instead the fact that the logic {1, 0,⊥,¬,∼,∨} is
functionally complete [2], which ensures that ⊕pi can be built from {¬,∼,∨}.
It is trivial to see that by considering Q∗, we lose the monotonicity with
respect to the inclusion ordering 6Q. In particular, for v, v
′ ∈ dom(α) with
v 6= v′, we have {(α, v′)} 6Q {(α, v), (α, v′)}, but 0 = J(α, v)K({(α, v′)}) 6
J(α, v)K({(α, v), (α, v′)}) = 1.
The function J·K is monotonic for atomic policies and requests in Q∗ if we
adopt the ordering ⊥ < 0 < 1. This means that omitting attributes can cause the
evaluation of an atomic policy to change from 1 to 0 or ⊥, or from 0 to ⊥. While
this seems to be reasonable, when combined with operators such as △, omitting
attributes can cause the evaluation of a policy to change from 0 to 1. (Thus a
user may be able to construct a request q ⊆ q′ that is allowed when q′ is not.
Any non-monotonic language, such as XACML, incorporates this vulnerability.)
4.3 ABAC with Explicit Conflict
The above choice to evaluate an atomic policy (α, v) to 1 if both (α, v) and
(α, v′) belongs to the query with v 6= v′ and v, v′ ∈ dom(α) could be regarded
as being logically inconsistent in the sense that the request also contains a non-
matching value. One could equally well argue, for example, that the request
should evaluate to 0.
In order to cope with such situations, we might, therefore, choose to work with
the 4-valued logic Four = {1, 0,⊥,⊤}, using ⊤ to denote conflicting information
(in contrast to ⊥ which signifies lack of information). We introduce the ordering
64, where d1 64 d2 if, and only if, d1 = ⊥, d1 = d2 or d2 = ⊤, and we define
J(α, v)K(q) =


⊤ if q ∋ (α, v), (α, v′) such that v, v′ ∈ dom(α) and v′ 6= v,
1 if q ∋ (α, v) and q 6∋ (α, v′) such that v′ 6= v,
0 if q 6∋ (α, v) and q ∋ (α, v′) such that v′ 6= v,
⊥ otherwise.
The definition of the policy operators ▽ and △ can be extended to unary oper-
ators on Four, where
▽d =


1 if d = ⊤,
d otherwise;
△ d =


0 if d = ⊤,
d otherwise.
Then the policy ▽(α, v) allows a request q whenever q contains a matching
attribute, while the policy △(α, v) denies a request q whenever q contains a non-
matching attribute value. Although the notion of conflicting policy decision has
already been studied [10], to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
this notion of conflict has been used to evaluate targets. Intuitively, a conflict
indicates that the request provides too much information for this particular
policy. It is worth observing that atomic policies are monotonic with respect to
the ordering 64, i.e., for all requests q and q
′ such that q 6Q∗ q
′ and for all
atomic policies (α, v), we have:
J(α, v)K(q) 64 J(α, v)K(q
′).
A possible way to extend the operators defined in Table 1 is to consider
the value ⊤ as absorbing: for any operator ⊕ : Threek → Three, we define the
operator ⊕ˆ : Fourk → Four as follows:
⊕ˆ(d1, . . . , dk) =


⊤ if di = ⊤ for some i ∈ [1, k],
⊕(d1, . . . , dk) otherwise.
Clearly, given an operator ⊕ defined over Three, if ⊕ is monotonic according to
63, then ⊕ˆ is also monotonic with respect to 64. It follows that we can still
safely use the operators generated by the operators ¬, ∧, ∨ and ∨∧, and we can
deduce that any realizable policy is also monotonic. However, we lose the result
of monotonic completeness, and we can no longer ensure that any monotonic
operator can be generated from this set of operators. Obtaining such a result
requires a deeper study of four-valued logic, and we leave it for future work.
5 Related Work
Much of the work on specification of access control languages can be traced back
to the early work of Woo and Lam, which considered the possibility that different
policy components might evaluate to different authorization decisions [14]. More
recent work has considered larger sets of policy decisions or more complex policy
operators (or both), and propose a formal representation of the corresponding
metamodel [15,16,10,13,17,2,18,19,20,21,22,5,23]. The “metamodels” in the lit-
erature are really attempts to fix an authorization vocabulary, by identifying the
sets and relations that will be used to define access control policies.
In contrast, our framework makes very few assumptions about access control
models and policies that are written in the context of a model. In this, our frame-
work most closely resembles the work of Tschantz and Krishnamurthi [11], which
considered a number of properties of a policy language, including determinism,
totality, safety and monotonicity.
The notion of a monotonic operator (as defined by [11]) is somewhat different
from ours. This is in part because a different ordering on the set of decisions Three
is used and because monotonicity is concerned with the inclusion of sub-policies
and the effect this has on policy evaluation. This contrasts with our approach,
where we are concerned with whether the exclusion of information from a re-
quest can influence the decision returned. (In fact, our concept of monotonicity
is closer to the notion of safety defined in [11]: if a request q is “lower” than q′,
then the decision returned for q is “lower” than that of q′.) We would express
their notion of monotonicity in the following way: a policy operator ⊕ is mono-
tonic (in the context of model M) if for all p1, . . . , pt ∈ P(M) and all q ∈ Q, if
⊕(p1 . . . , pt)(q) ∈ {1, 0}, then ⊕(p1, . . . , pi, p′, pi+1, pt)(q) 6= ⊥ for any i and any
policy p′ ∈ P(M). Moreover, our framework is concerned with arbitrary autho-
rization vocabularies and queries, unlike that of Tschantz and Krishnamurthi,
which focused on the standard subject-object-action request format. The only
assumption we make is that all policies can be represented using a tree-like struc-
ture and that policy decisions can be computed from the values assigned to leaf
nodes and the interpretation of the operators at each non-leaf node.
In addition, we define the notion of completeness of a model, which is con-
cerned with the expressivity of the policy operators. There exists prior work on
comparing the expressive power of different access control models or the extent
to which one model is able to simulate another [24,25,26]. In this paper, we show
how our framework enables us to establish whether a model based on a particular
set of atomic policies, decision set and policy connectives is complete. We can,
therefore, compare the completeness of two different models by, for example, fix-
ing an authorization vocabulary and comparing the completeness of models that
differ in one or more of the models’ components (that is, ones that differ in the
set of connectives, decision sets, atomic policies and authorization semantics).
While this is similar in spirit to earlier work, this is not the primary aim of this
paper, although it would certainly be a fertile area for future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a generic framework for specifying access control controls,
within which a large variety of access control models arise as special cases, and
which allows us to reason about the global properties of such systems. A major
strength of our approach is that we do not provide “yet another access con-
trol language”. The framework is not intended to provide an off-the-shelf policy
language or PDP (unlike XACML, for example), nor is it intended to be an
access control model (in the style of RBAC96, say). Rather, we try to model all
aspects of an access control system at an abstract level and to provide a frame-
work that can be instantiated in many different ways, depending on the choices
made for request attributes, atomic policies, policy decisions and policy evalu-
ation functions. In doing so we are able to identify (i) how and why an access
control system may fail to be sufficiently expressive (completeness), and (ii) how
and why having an expressive access control system may lead to vulnerabilities
(monotonicity).
There are many opportunities for future work. The notions of monotonicity
and completeness are examples of general properties of an access control model
that we can characterize formally within our framework. We have already noted
that there are at least two alternative semantics for atomic policies having the
form (α, v) for a three-valued decision set and even more alternatives for a four-
valued decision set. It would be interesting to see how these alternative semantics
affect monotonicity and completeness. We would like to study the composition
of access control models, and under what circumstances composition preserves
monotonicity and completeness. Further properties that are of interest include
policy equivalence, policy ordering (where, informally, one policy P1 is “more
restrictive” than P2 if it denies every request that is denied by P2), which may
allow us to define what it means for a realizable policy to be “optimal” with
respect to an (unrealizable) ideal policy. Moreover, our definition of monotonicity
is dependent on the ordering on the set of decisions. Monotonicity, in the context
of the ordering 0 < ⊥ < 1, for example, is a stronger property than the one
we have considered in this paper. Again, it would be interesting to investigate
the appropriateness of different forms of monotonicity. Furthermore, although
XACML is proven not to be monotonic, it is not known under which conditions it
can be monotonically-complete, and if additional operators are needed to prove
this property, which is also likely to depend on the decision orderings considered.
In this paper, we have assumed that there exists an ideal policy and that such
a policy is fixed. Generally, however, a system evolves over time, and an access
control policy will need to be updated to cope with changes to that system that
affect the users, resources, or context. Thus it may be more realistic to specify
an initial ideal policy, which might be extremely simple, and the access control
policy that best approximates it, and then define rules by which the access con-
trol policy may evolve. With this in mind, it makes sense to regard the access
control policy (or components thereof) as a protected object. Security is then de-
fined in terms of properties that “reachable” access control policies must satisfy.
Typical examples of such properties are “liveness” and “safety” [27]. Including
administrative policies within our framework and investigating properties such
as liveness and safety will be an important aspect of our future work in this area.
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